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Abstract 
Income inequality and house prices have risen sharply in developed countries during the last 
three decades. We argue that this co-movement is no coincidence but that inequality has 
driven up house prices on the grounds that it raises the total demand for houses, which inflates 
their prices considering supply restrictions. To test this hypothesis, we conduct cointegration 
tests for a panel of 18 OECD countries for the period 1975-2010. The results suggest that 
income inequality and house prices in most OECD countries are positively correlated and 
cointegrated, and that in the majority of cases absolute inequality Granger-causes house 
prices when measured in absolute terms. Relative inequality, on the other hand, is not 
cointegrated with house prices, which is expected given that total house demand depends on 
the absolute amount of investible income. 
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1. Introduction 
Variations in house prices can have important macroeconomic effects. Rising house prices 
stimulate consumption expenditure and economic growth when they increase the security 
feeling of homeowners and ease access to credit—so called wealth and collateral effects 
(Case et al., 2005a; 2005b, 2013; Iacoviello, 2004). However, at the same time, easier access 
to credit can foster unsustainable debt-driven growth models, and declining house prices can 
lead to large reductions in household consumption and prolonged recessions. Indeed, all of 
these effects have been observed prior to and after the Great Recession (Mian et al., 2013; 
Jordá et al., 2014; Mian and Sufi, 2015; Goda et al., 2016). 
Moreover, starkly rising prices can make housing unaffordable. This especially concerns 
the most productive urban areas and low income households (Dewilde and Lancee, 2013; 
Gyourko et al., 2013)1. Finally, house price inflation can translate in to retail price inflation 
(Stroebel and Vavra, 2014), which can have important implications for monetary policy and 
is also seen to affect mainly low income households (see Easterly and Fischer (2001) on the 
latter).  
Considering these potential socio-economic effects, it is not surprising that a vast literature 
on the dynamics of house prices exist (especially in the aftermath of the US Subprime Crisis). 
Typically, income growth is identified as an important long-run determinant of house prices 
(Case and Shiller, 2003; ECB, 2003). However, in developed countries “in the past two 
decades preceding the 2008 global financial crisis, real house price growth outpaced income 
growth by a substantial margin” (Knoll et al., 2014: 23). Recent literature suggests that this 
phenomenon is mainly explained by low real interest rates coupled with credit expansion 
(Taylor, 2007; Goodhart and Hofman, 2008; Gerdesmeier et al., 2010; Agnello and 
Schuknecht, 2011). 
                                                
1 In the UK, for example, “Homes in popular towns and London boroughs have risen to 10 and 20 times local 
incomes, while rents account for up to 78% of earnings” (Collinson, 2015). 
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Other studies also consider financial innovation and deregulation (Dokko et al., 2011; 
Bordo and London-Lane, 2013), and global liquidity (Sá et al., 2014; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 
2015) as explanatory factors. All of these determinants have in common that they are seen to 
increase the total demand for houses, which leads to increasing prices taking into account 
that house supply is restricted. However, they also have in common that they mostly took 
place in the first decade of the twentieth first century. 
The aim of the present paper is to assess rising income inequality as an alternative 
contributing factor for an increase in demand for houses during the period 1975-2010. It is 
well established that houses are mainly bought by the upper part of the distribution (although 
houses are more evenly distributed than financial assets). The top 10% percentage share in 
house ownership in OECD countries typically is between 40% (Italy) and 60% (US) and the 
Gini coefficient ranges between 0.6 and 0.7 (Cowell et al., 2012), even rising to above 0.9 
when only non-primary residences are considered (Bonesmo Fredriksen, 2012). It is also well 
established that income inequality increased starkly in most developed countries after 1980, 
especially due to income concentration at the top (OECD, 2015). 
Our hypothesis is therefore that the co-movement of income inequality and house prices 
is no coincidence and that the increase in inequality has driven up house demand and, in turn, 
their prices. This supposition is in line with theoretical models that provide two potential 
mechanisms that are in play: (i) with rising inequality the number of households increases 
that are willing to pay higher prices for their homes (Gyourko et al., 2013); (ii) houses are an 
investment good for the upper part of the income distribution and in more unequal countries 
the investment demand is higher (Nakajima, 2005; Zhang, 2016). In both cases, the change 
in demand is expected to drive up house prices when supply restrictions are considered. 
To our best knowledge, so far no study has tested empirically if the stark increase in real 
house prices in OECD countries during the last decades was partly driven by rising income 
inequality. To close this gap in the literature and test our hypothesis, the present study 
conducts cointegration tests for a panel of 18 OECD countries for the period 1975-2010. 
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Given the evident nonstationarity of house prices and inequality we use cointegration based 
methods to avoid problems of spurious regression. Additionally, our interest is centered in 
the existence of a long-term relationship between both variables. 
A second novelty of our study is that we will use both absolute and relative inequality 
measures to test our hypothesis.2 The difference between relative and absolute inequality 
measures is that the former report proportional income differences (e.g. the Gini coefficient), 
while the latter refer to income differences in monetary terms (e.g. the variance).3 Studies 
that investigate the impact of inequality on socio-economic variables like growth and crime 
typically only account for relative inequality measures. However, in view of the investment 
demand for houses depending on the absolute amount of investible income and that “it is the 
absolute level of resources, not their relative distribution, that affects access to housing” 
(Dewilde and Lancee, 2013: 1189), we expect that absolute inequality measures are more 
suitable for our purpose.  
Indeed, we find that absolute income inequality and house prices in OECD countries are 
positively correlated and cointegrated (with the notable exception of Germany, Japan, and 
Korea), whereas the relative inequality measures are not cointegrated. Importantly, we find 
that in the majority of cases absolute inequality Granger-causes house prices, whereas house 
prices do not Granger-cause income inequality. In other words, the increase in absolute 
income inequality has driven up house prices, whereas in most countries the increase in house 
price seemingly has not contributed to the observed inequality increase. 
Moreover, the results confirm previous findings that decreasing real short-term interest 
rates also have contributed to the long-term increase in real house prices (at least in some 
countries). Real GDP, on the contrary, shows no signs of cointegration with OECD house 
                                                
2 Our measures for overall inequality changes are the Gini coefficient and the variance, while our measures for 
changes in the concentration of income are the top 5% income share and the top 5% market income. 
3 Absolute and relative inequality trends can be quite different. If, for example, the income of the whole 
population increases by the same percentage, the Gini and Theil coefficients remain constant, even though the 
absolute income gap increases. 
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prices, which is in line with Knoll et al.’s (2014) observation that real house price growth in 
OECD countries has been much higher than income growth. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section Two details the theoretical link between 
inequality and house prices. Section Three gives an overview of the research design. Section 
Four presents the results concerning the impact of (absolute) inequality on house prices. 
Section Five concludes the paper. 
2. The theoretical link between (absolute) inequality and house prices 
The models that examine whether inequality affects house prices are typically general 
equilibrium models that have three main conditions in common: First, the existence of 
heterogeneous agents, so that inequalities can be analysed. Second, house supply is assumed 
to be at least very inelastic, so that the house market adjusts to demand shocks by price 
changes. Third, the presence of frictions that limit the access to the house market. 
According to these models, inequality can affect house prices via two demand 
mechanisms: (i) when houses are considered as consumption goods, an increase in income 
inequality raises the amount of people that are willing to pay high prices in order to access 
to certain areas; and (ii) when houses are considered as rent generating assets, inequality is 
expected to increase the absolute amount of savings (assuming that the propensity to consume 
decreases with higher incomes), which in turn raises the total demand for houses. 
Regarding the first mechanism, Gyourko et al. (2013) presents a model in which two types 
of houses exist. The first type has an elastic supply, whereas the second type has an inelastic 
supply and is preferred by households. The model also differentiates between low and high 
wage earners. When the wage distribution changes in favour of high wage earners, more 
people desire to live in (and can pay for) the preferred houses that have an inelastic supply. 
As a result, the price of preferred houses increase and thus also the average house price, given 
that the houses with elastic supply experience a quantitative adjustment. 
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Määttänen and Terviö (2014) present a related model but differentiate houses according 
to their quality. The quality is defined as a continuous spectrum, which implies that the supply 
is perfectly inelastic for each quality type of house. Agents are assumed to maximize their 
utility choosing between goods consumption and the quality of their residence.4 With 
increasing inequality low income households’ willingness to pay for the quality of houses 
decreases, whereas the willingness of high income households to pay for the quality of houses 
increases. The outcome is that rising inequality leads to lower prices for low quality houses 
and to higher prices for high quality houses. The overall effect on house prices depends on 
which of these opposing effects dominates. 
The second line of research considers houses as assets. Nakajima (2005) uses a life-cycle 
general equilibrium model with portfolio allocation between housing and a financial asset to 
explain changes in the demand for houses. The return of each asset is determined by the ratio 
of the total return in terms of the available quantity. Houses are assumed to be inelastic, 
whereas the financial asset is assumed to be elastic with a decreasing marginal productivity. 
Rising income inequality increases savings, assuming an increasing marginal propensity to 
save with increasing incomes. The additional savings are first invested in the financial asset. 
However, the increase in demand decreases the return of these assets (assuming elastic supply 
and decreasing marginal productivity). Consequently, investors will switch their investment 
to the house market. The increasing demand for houses increase their price on the grounds 
that their supply is assumed to be inelastic. 
Zhang (2016), on the other hand, proposes an incomplete market model with 
heterogeneous households and an exogenously given house supply. In the same vein as 
Nakajima (2005), Zhang treats houses as an asset that competes against an alternative asset 
(i.e. bonds) but in his model houses have a higher rate of return than the investment 
alternative. The reason why the return is higher is that houses are assumed to be a risk-free 
                                                
4 The model assumes that each household only owns one house and that it chooses the quality level according 
to its income.   
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investment and that entry barriers to the market exist. Given its relatively high return, 
households always want to invest in the house market. However, the poor have not enough 
income to enter the market and middle-income households can only hold a minimum amount 
of houses. Top income households, on the other hand, are not constrained and increase 
investment income in the house market. Rising inequality thus leads to increasing house 
demand and, in turn, to an increase in their prices. 
Finally, Matlack and Vigdor (2008) present a model that considers the importance of land 
as a production factor and of houses as consumption goods (land that can be transformed into 
houses without any cost). The model assumes that the quantity of land is constant, that 
workers are divided according to their skills (high- and low-skilled), that wages equal 
marginal productivity, and production has a neoclassical function production.5 Considering 
this setting, rising wage inequality leads to an increase in house prices when the marginal 
productivity of land is constant. This is the case because house demand of high-skilled 
workers increases by more than the demand from low-skilled workers decreases given that 
the amount of land available for households is unchanged. 
All of these potential mechanisms have in common that an increase of the absolute level 
of income at the top leads to an increase house demand. It therefore seems important to 
distinguish between relative and absolute income inequality when empirically studying the 
impact of income inequality on house prices. The most widely used relative inequality index 
is the Gini coefficient (1), whereas the variance is typically used when measuring absolute 
income differences (2) (see Goda and Torres García, 2016). The main difference between 
these two indices is that the Gini coefficient normalizes the sum of income differences with 
the mean income (!), whereas the variance subtracts ! from individual incomes.  
                                                
5 More specifically, the authors assume the following production function: " = $%&'()*+,%,',), where $ 
are high-skilled workers, & are low-skilled workers and ( is land. Changes in -, . or /, not only change the 
marginal productivity of each factor, but also the participation in total income. Hence, a variation in the values 
of these parameters changes the distribution of income.  
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Gini = +3 +45 +6 78 − 7:48;+4:;+  (1) 
Variance = +4 7: − ! 64:;+  (2) 
where N is population size, ! is mean income, 7: is income of the i-th individual, and 78 is 
the income of the j-th individual. 
An important property of the Gini coefficient is that its value is independent of overall 
income, whereas the opposite is true for the variance. To make this more palpable, Figure 1 
shows the income distribution of two countries, which are both assumed to have a population 
size of five. Although the income per capita of Country B is much higher than that of Country 
A, the Gini coefficient of both countries is identical (0.38). On the contrary, the value of the 
variance of both countries is quite distinct: the variance of Country B is 4,616, while that of 
Country A is only 46. 
Figure 1: Relative vs. Absolute Inequality 
 
 
As well as overall inequality the absolute amount of investible income of the upper part 
of the distribution in Country B is much higher than that of Country A. According to the 
above discussed theories, one would therefore expect that, that households in Country B 
would pay higher prices for houses as consumption goods and also would have a higher 
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demand for houses as an investment good. As a result house prices in Country B should be 
higher than in Country A (everything else equal). Similarly, when the Gini coefficient in both 
countries would increase by the same amount, the absolute amount of income at the upper 
part of the distribution would increase by more in Country B than in Country A, and 
consequently also house prices in Country B should increase by more than in Country A.  
Figure 2 suggests that in most OECD countries real house prices and absolute income 
inequality are positively correlated and nonstationary. To deal with nonstationarity and avoid 
the associated problem of spurious regression we use cointegration based methods. The 
remainder of this paper tests whether income inequality and house prices in OECD countries 
are cointegrated with a positive correlation in the long-run and with the direction of causation 
running from inequality to house prices. 
Figure 2: Real house prices and absolute inequality in OECD countries, 1975-2010 
 
Note: This graphs shows the evolution of the logarithm of the income variance (VAR, left axis) and the logarithm 
of real house prices (RHP, right axis) in 18 selected OECD countries during the period 1975-2010. 
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3. Research design 
3.1 General specification and data 
Consider the following potential cointegrating equation of interest: AB $CD = .+ + .6FGHID + 	KD (3) 
where AB $CD  is the natural logarithm of real house prices and FGHID are different income 
inequality measures. The house price data are yearly averages of the OECD real house price 
index. The four inequality measures considered are (i) the Gini coefficient (LMBMD), (ii) the 
top income share (NOP5%D), (iii) the income variance in constant PPP (AB(TUVMUBWXD)), and 
(iv) the market income of the top 5% income earners in constant US$ (AB(NOP5$D)). 
The market Gini coefficient is retrieved from Solt’s Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID, V5.0). The SWIID combines and adjusts Gini coefficients from 
different sources and currently is the most extensive publicly available database of income 
Gini coefficients that are comparable across countries and time. SWIID data have been 
widely used in previous studies concerned with income inequality.6  
Data on real house prices and Gini coefficients are available on a yearly basis for 18 
countries: Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland 
(FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), the 
Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NEW), Norway (NOR), South Korea (KOR), Spain 
(SPA), Sweden (SWE), the UK (UKD) and the USA (USA). 
Following Goda and Torres García (2016), the retrieved Gini coefficients are used to 
estimate the other three inequality measures. Income shares are not readily available on a 
frequent basis, so first ventile income shares are obtained.7 Supposing a lognormal 
                                                
6 See, for example, Bergh and Nilsson (2010), Fox and Hoelscher (2012), Agnello and Soussa (2014), Herzer 
et al. (2014), Chon (2015) and Goda and Torres García (2016). 
7 Ventile shares are frequently used in the literature (the lowest ventile represents the poorest 5% of the 
population, etc.) because they allow for relatively exact inequality estimates when differences within income 
groups are not taken into account (see Davies and Shorrocks, 1989; Milanovic, 2012). 
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distribution, the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve can be 
expressed as follows (Aitchison and Brown, 1966): 
 &(P) = [([,+ P − σ:), (4) 
where Φ is the lognormal cumulative distribution function of income, P is the percentile of 
the distribution, and :^ is the standard deviation, which is associated with the Gini coefficient 
of each country and year under study as is shown by the following expression: 
 :^ = 2[,+ +`ab6 , (5) 
where L: is the Gini coefficient of the i-th country. Hence, changes in the Gini coefficient 
affect the estimation of the standard deviation and, consequently, of the Lorenz curve and the 
income share of the P-th percent of the population. It is important to note that a higher Gini 
coefficient leads to a higher standard deviation, which implies that the population at the 
bottom (top) has a lower (higher) income share. 
The obtained income shares are then used to calculate the income variance:  
cUV = dbd +6e (f:g ∗ LiC:) − LiCPW: 66eg;+j:;+  (6) 
where B: denotes the population size of the i-th country, LiCgk: is the mean per capita income 
of the i-th country, f:g is the income share of the p-th population ventile of the i-th country, 
and LiC: is the total income of the i-th country. 
 
3.2 Determining stationary, trend stationary and nonstationary series 
After having derived these data, we test for each of these variables’ order of integration 
and then consider whether their (log) ratios are stationary (cointegrate with a unit coefficient). 
To establish if the necessary condition for cointegration between real house prices (AB($CD)) 
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and the inequality measures (FGHID) is satisfied, first Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test is 
applied to the natural log of real house prices and the four inequality variables. Pesaran’s 
(2007) test assumes linear adjustment, can deal with cross-sectional dependence and is based 
upon the following time-series regression estimated for each M: 
∆m:,D = U:o + -:op + q:om:,D,+ + W:,eo mD,+ + W:,8o ∆m:,Dgb8;+ + r:,8o ∆mD,8gb8;e + K:,Do   (7) 
where, M = 1, 2, … , G; p = 1, 2, … , N, ∆mD = +4 m:,D4:;+   and  mD,+ = +4 m:,D,+4:;+ . 
The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root for all cross-sectional units, q:o = 0 ∀	M while 
the alternative is that m:,D is stationary for at least one cross-section,  q:o < 0 for at least one M. The CADF statistic for each cross-section is the OLS t-ratio corresponding to q:o, denoted p:o G, N = xbyz{by. The panel test statistic, |FC}, is: 
|FC} = +4 p:o G, N4:;+   (8) 
The version of the test that we use is based upon truncated CADF statistics, following the 
scheme given in Pesaran (2007) and denoted p:o∗ G, N , thus:  
|FC}∗ = +4 p:o∗ G, N4:;+   (9) 
To corrobate the obtained results, in a second step Cerrato et al.’s (2009, 2011) 
heterogeneous nonlinear panel unit root tests are used. Cerrato et al’s test assumes a 
stationary common factor across individual units to account for cross-sectional dependence. 
It involves estimating the following nonlinear auxiliary regression by ordinary least squares 
(OLS): 
∆m:,D = U:~ + -:~p + q:~m:,D,+ + W:,e~ mD,+ + W:,8~ ∆m:,Dgb8;+ + r:,8~ ∆mD,8gb8;e + K:,D~   (10) 
where, mD,+ = +4 m:,D,+4:;+ . A time trend, p, is included following Cerrato et al (2013) and 
the lag length, P:, can be determined using information criteria.  
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The null hypothesis is q:~ = 0 ∀	M, while the alternative is q:~ < 0 for at least one M. The 
t-ratios for each cross-section, denoted p:~ G, N = xbÄz{bÄ, where q:~  is the OLS estimate of q:~  
and ÅxbÄ is the corresponding OLS coefficient standard error, are used to calculate the panel 
test statistic: 
p G, N = +4 p:~ G, N4:;+   (11) 
If the test statistic is not more negative than the critical value, reported in Cerrato et al 
(2009 and 2011), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Simulations indicate that this test 
has superior size and power than Pesaran’s (2007) test when the data generating process is 
nonlinear. 
For both panel unit root tests the sequential panel selection method (SPSM), proposed by 
Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009), is applied to identify which cross-sections (countries) are 
stationary and which are nonstationary (the procedure is explained within the context of 
Cerrato et al’s (2009, 2011) test)8. The null hypothesis is that all countries’ series are I(1) and 
the alternative is that at least one country’s series is I(0). 
The SPSM essentially involves applying the panel unit root test, p G, N , to all G countries 
and if the null cannot be rejected the procedure stops and all countries’ series I(1). However, 
if the null hypothesis is rejected at least one country’s series is I(0) and we exclude the 
country that that rejects the I(1) null the most, which is the one that has the smallest (most 
negative) individual country test statistic, ÇMB p:~ G, N . The panel unit root test statistic, p G − 1, N , is calculated for the remaining G − 1 countries. 
If the null cannot be rejected the procedure stops and the G − 1 countries’ series included 
in this panel unit root test are all I(1) and the 1 country’s series that was excluded from this 
test is I(0). However, if the null hypothesis is rejected at least one of these G − 1 countries’ 
                                                
8
 Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009) apply the SPSM procedure to the Im et al (2003) panel unit root test that does not account for cross-
sectional dependence. 
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series is I(0) and we exclude the country that has the smallest individual country test statistic, ÇMB p:~ G − 1, N , and the panel unit root test, p G − 2, N , is calculated for the remaining G − 2 countries. This process continues until the panel unit root test cannot reject the null. 
All countries’ series included in this last test are I(1) and all countries’ series excluded from 
this last test are I(0). 
To finally determine which series is stationary, trend-stationary or nonstationary we use 
the following procedure: if the unit root null is rejected using the test including only an 
intercept as a deterministic term the series is stationary. However, if the null is not rejected, 
the unit root test including both an intercept and trend is considered. If the null of this test is 
rejected the series is trend stationary, whereas if the null is not rejected the series has a unit 
root.  
The Cerrato et al (2009 and 2011) test assumes nonlinear adjustment (possibly 
approximating structural breaks) whereas the Pesaran (2007) test assumes linear adjustment. 
Since each test is most powerful for the adjustment it is designed for we infer stationarity if 
either test indicates stationary. Further, if either test suggests trend stationarity and neither 
indicates stationarity we will infer trend stationarity. Otherwise, we infer a unit root. 
 
3.3 Determining cointegration and causality 
We then proceed to test for cointegration between AB($CD) and FGHID by applying 
Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration test. We use the xtwest command, provided by 
Persyn and Westerlund (2008), with the Stata program, to produce all of the reported results 
associated with Westerlund’s (2007) method. Westerlund’s (2007) tests use the following 
model assuming a single cointegrating vector:9  
∆m:,D = É+,: + É6,:p + -:m:,D,+ + Ñ:ÖÜ:,D,+ + -:8∆m:,D,8gb8;+ + á:8Ö ∆Ü:,D,8gb8;,àb + X:,D  (12) 
                                                
9 Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) tests also assume a single cointegrating equation. 
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where, Ü:,DÖ = f+,:,D f6,:,D … fâ,:,D  is a vector containing * explanatory variables that 
are assumed to be weakly exogenous while the inclusion of ä: lead values prevents the 
violation of strict exogeneity. The number of leads and lags is chosen to minimise Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) as implemented with Persyn and Westerlund’s (2008) Stata 
program. 
The null of no cointegration for any cross-sectional unit, $e:	-: = 0 ∀	M, is tested against 
two different alternative hypotheses. The two group mean statistics, denoted Lå and L%, 
specify the alternative as cointegration for at least one cross-sectional unit: $+a:	-: < 0 for 
at least one M. L% utilises a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
adjustment where we set the bandwidth parameter using: ç: = 4 è+ee 6 ê, giving ç: = 3.10 
The two panel statistics, denoted Cå and C%,11 specify the alternative hypothesis that there is 
cointegration for all cross-sectional units, that is, $+o:	-: < 0 ∀	M.12  
The 4 panel cointegration statistics are normalised using the asymptotic moments reported 
in Table 1 of Westerlund (2007) and have an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Any 
normalised statistic that is less negative (greater) than the left-tail critical value implies that 
the no cointegration null should not be rejected. We report bootstrapped probability values 
(using 600 replications), that are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional dependence, 
as produced by Persyn and Westerlund’s (2008) program.13  
                                                
10 We set the maximum number of lead and lags in (12) to 3.  
11 The L% and C% statistics may reject the null too often in small samples (though not asymptotically). 
Westerlund (2007) suggests that “[g]iven their faster rate of divergence, it is probable that the coefficient tests L% and C% have higher power than Lå and Cå in samples where N is substantially larger than G”. This suggests 
that L% should be favoured when N is large relative to G (as in our case). However, Westerlund’s (2007) 
simulation results for smaller sample sizes (with N = 100 and N = 200 as well as G = 10 and G = 20)  suggest 
that Lå has slightly better size and power compared to L%, hence Lå may be more appropriate for our analysis 
where N is not large. 
12 We find that when cointegration is supported it is based on at least one of the panel statistics suggesting 
cointegration for the whole panel of countries. 
13 Pedroni’s (1999 and 2004) panel cointegration tests assume cross-sectional independence although Pedroni 
(2004) applies them using cross-sectionally demeaned data to address cross-sectional dependence. However, 
cross-sectional demeaning only addresses the common time effects form of cross-sectional dependence.  
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Unlike the residual based tests of Pedroni (1999 and 2004) that are most commonly 
employed in panel cointegration analysis, Westerlund’s (2007) method does not assume that 
common factor restrictions hold. Residual based tests have substantially lower power 
(especially in small samples) compared to Westerlund’s (2007) error-correction method 
when the common factor restrictions do not hold – see Persyn and Westurlund (2008). As 
Westerlund (2007) notes, “[i]f weak exogeneity fails, then the error correction test may have 
low power, while if the common factor restriction fails, then the residual based tests may 
have low power.” The power of Pedroni’s (1999, 2004) tests are also adversely affected when 
weak exogeneity is violated, if not as much as Westerlund’s (2007) tests can be. 
Westerlund (2007) concludes that, “… under the maintained assumption of weak 
exogeneity, the new tests perform well with good size and power in most panels. In particular, 
we find that the error correction tests have both better size accuracy and vastly superior power 
in comparison with residual based tests. We also find that the bootstrapped versions of the 
new tests are very effective in eliminating the effects of the cross-sectional dependence 
without sacrificing power.” Westerlund continues, “We further show that this difference in 
power arises mainly because the residual-based tests ignore potentially valuable information 
by imposing a possibly invalid common factor restriction.” These conclusions are robust to 
different sample sizes and deterministic components. However, when weak exogeneity is 
violated, while the size of Westerlund’s (2007) tests are broadly correct the power can be 
low. Nevertheless, Westerlund’s (2007) tests have good power when the adjustment 
coefficient in the differenced equation of a regressor is positive (although not when this 
coefficient is negative). “Zivot (2000) also presents several reasons for why weak exogeneity 
may not be too much of a problem in practice. One reason is that it can be readily tested as a 
restriction on the unconditional model, which in the current panel data setting corresponds to 
the panel vector error correction model studied by Larsson et al. (2001). Another reason is 
that there appears to be strong support for the weak exogeneity assumption in many 
applications, see Zivot (2000) and the references therein.” Westerlund (2007). 
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While we first assess the weak exogeneity assumption by applying the Westerlund (2007) 
test to the reverse regression of inequality on house prices the use of the Westerlund (2007) 
cointegration test for weak exogeneity in this way is only suggestive. The reasons for this 
include the following. First, the cointegrating equations in the autiregressive distributed lag 
(ADL) models are different when the difference of AB($CD) is the dependent variable and 
when the difference of inequality is the dependent variable. Second, leads and lags of the 
differenced regressors (and not the dependent variable) are included in the ADL model. A 
more typical test for weak exogeneity is based on the error-correction form of a vector 
autoregression (VAR), typically referred to as the restricted vector error correction model 
(VECM) or VEC.14 The VEC, assuming 1 cointegrating equation with (unrestricted) 
intercept and no trend, in this two variable system would be specified as follows for country M: 
∆AB $CD = 7++ + 7+68∆	FGHID,8g8;+ + 7+8∆AB $CD,8g8;+ + -+ AB $CD,+ − .6	FGHID,+∆FGHI = 76+ + 7668∆	FGHID,8g8;+ + 768∆AB $CD,8g8;+ + -6 AB $CD,+ − .6	FGHID,+ 			  (13) 
The t-tests for weak exogeneity, and long-run Granger non-causality (LRGNC), are based 
on the following hypotheses: 
• $e+:	-+ = 0, implies that AB $CD  is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters 
in the equation for ∆FGHI and FGHI does not Granger-cause AB $CD  in the long-run. 
Whereas $í+:	-+ ≠ 0 implies that AB $CD  is not weakly exogenous with respect to the 
parameters in the equation for ∆FGHI and FGHI Granger-causes AB $CD  in the long-
run. 
• $e6:	-6 = 0, implies that FGHI is weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters in 
the equation for ∆AB $CD  and that AB $CD  does not Granger-cause FGHI in the long-
                                                
14 The restricted VECM, or VEC, imposes the number and form of cointegrating equations on the unrestricted 
VECM. 
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run. Whereas $í6:	-6 ≠ 0 implies that FGHI is not weakly exogenous with respect to 
the equation for ∆AB $CD  and that AB $CD  Granger-causes FGHI in the long-run. 
In applying the Granger non-causality (GNC) tests we estimate the system (13) for each 
country with time-series regressions using previously defined cointegrating equations to 
define the error-correction terms. We subtract the mean of these error-correction terms to 
produce new zero mean error-correction terms to be used in a slightly modified version of 
(13) when applying the GNC tests. An unrestricted intercept is included in this modified 
version of (13). The lag lengths for each country are determined using the AIC with a 
maximum lag of (P =) 3. 
 
3.4 Robustness checks 
Finally, we conduct two robustness checks. The first is a bivariate cointegration analysis 
that tests if income growth (real GDP, retrieved from AMECO) is a determinant of AB $CD : AB $CD = .+ + .6ln	(LiC)D + 	KD (14) 
As mentioned in the introduction, income growth is found to be an important house price 
diver. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that absolute inequality is strongly related to overall income. 
Hence, it might be that income growth rather than absolute inequality growth was the main 
driver behind the growth in OECD house prices. 
The second robustness check involves two trivariate cointegration models that account for 
monetary policy (r) as potential omitted variable: AB $CD = .+ + .6FGHID + .rD + 	KD (15) AB $CD = .+ + .6ln	(LiC)D + .rD + 	KD (16) 
Loose monetary policy is the most mentioned potential driver behind the recent upsurge 
in OECD house prices and interest rate data are readily available. The monetary proxy used 
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is the nominal 3-month nominal interbank interest rate from OECD.stat and the St. Louis Fed 
(Germany and Ireland), adjusted with consumer price inflation.  
4. The impact of (absolute) income inequality on house prices 
4.1 Are real house prices and income inequality cointegrated? 
Pesaran’s (2007) and Cerrato et al.’s (2011) unit root tests (allowing for both linear and 
nonlinear adjustment) suggest that AB($CD) and our four inequality measures are at least I(1) 
for the vast majority of the 18 sample countries. To be more precise, the number of countries 
that are found to be I(1) according to at least one of the two test are: 13 for the logged real 
house price index (AB($CD)), 16 for the Gini coefficient (LMBMD), 15 for the top 5% income 
share (NOP5%D), 17 for the logged income variance (AB(cUVD)), and 16 for the logged market 
income of the top 5% (AB(NOP5$D)).15 
That not all countries’ variables are I(1) may be due to factors such as Type I errors. 
Hence, we treat all series as if they are I(1), satisfying the necessary condition for 
cointegration, and proceed to conduct tests of cointegration.16 If the assumption that the 
necessary condition for cointegration being satisfied is incorrect this may manifest itself in 
the rejection of cointegration. 
We therefore proceed to test for cointegration between AB($CD) and FGHID by applying 
Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration test. For the two relative inequality measures, LMBMD 
and NOP5%D, all four tests for both sets of deterministic terms cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. Hence, it is unambiguous that there is no evidence of cointegration between AB($CD) and LMBMD and AB($CD) and NOP5%D. For AB(cUVD) all four tests indicate 
cointegration at the 5% level when the intercept is the only deterministic term included in the 
                                                
15 Details about the unit root tests and their results are available on request. 
16 If some of the series are I(0) this should not be an issue because the ADL method can identify error-correction 
relationships when some series are I(1) and others are I(0) – although the critical values  reported in Westerlund 
(2007) assume I(1) variables. 
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model (when both an intercept and trend are included in the model cointegration is only 
indicated at the 5% level by 2 tests). For AB(NOP5$D) three tests reject the no cointegration 
null at the 1% level while the other test, L%, rejects it at the 10% level when only an intercept 
is included in the model. When both an intercept and trend are included in the model one test, Lå indicates cointegration at the 5% level. 
Table 1: Robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration tests of ïñ(óòô) on öõúùô 
 ûöõöô ü†°¢%ô ïñ(£§•ô) ïñ(ü†°¢$ô) 
Det Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Lå 0.898 0.315 0.902 0.293 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.030** L% 0.782 0.277 0.813 0.168 0.025** 0.052* 0.058* 0.268 Cå 0.325 0.200 0.328 0.145 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.063** C% 0.305 0.335 0.295 0.252 0.010** 0.053* 0.002*** 0.105 
Leads 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.22 1.50 1.22 1.61 
Lags 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.11 1.22 1.11 1.28 
Table 1 notes. The row labelled FGHID denotes the inequality measure involved in the potential cointegrating 
equation with AB($CD) as the dependent variable and the row labelled Det specifies the deterministic terms 
included in the cointegration equation as Int when only an intercept is included and Trend when both an 
intercept and trend are included. Lå and L% denote the tests when the alternative hypothesis is that there is 
cointegration for at least one country in the panel, based on OLS and heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) coefficient standard errors, respectively. Cå and C% denote the tests when the alternative 
hypothesis is that there is cointegration for all 18 countries in the panel, based on OLS and HAC coefficient 
standard errors, respectively. The null hypothesis for all four tests is that there is no cointegration for any of the 
18 countries in the panel. The reported statistics are the bootstrapped probability values (using 600 replications) 
that are robust to cross-sectional dependence. The average number of leads and lags (selected with the AIC) 
used in the 18 countries’ error-correction models are specified in the rows labelled Leads and Lags, respectively. 
A maximum of 3 leads and lags are allowed. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the non-cointegration null at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All results reported in this table are produced with Stata 14 IC using the 
xtwest command provided by Persyn and Westerlund (2008). 
In summary, there is no evidence of cointegration between AB($CD) and the two relative 
inequality measures, LFGFD and NOP5%D. In contrast, there is strong evidence supporting 
cointegration between AB($CD) and the two absolute inequality measures AB(c(¶D) and AB(NOP5$D)), especially when only an intercept is included in the model. Because both of 
the panel statistics, Cå and C%, support cointegration at least at the 5% level for both absolute 
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inequality measures when only an intercept is included in the model this suggests that this is 
the case for all 18 countries in the panel with homogeneous long-run coefficients. 
 
4.2 The long-run relationship between house prices and absolute inequality 
Given the general evidence in favour of cointegration with homogeneous long-run 
coefficients across all 18 countries for both absolute measures of inequality we report the 
implied estimated homogeneous long-run relationships for these measures in Table 2. When 
both an intercept and trend are included in the model the trend term is insignificant at the 1% 
level for both absolute inequality measures. This suggests that the trend term can be excluded 
from the long-run equation and that cointegrating equations including a trend should not be 
favoured. This is consistent with the model including both intercept and trend providing less 
support for cointegration than the model where the intercept is the only deterministic term 
(as reported in Table 1). Hence, we favour inference from the models where the intercept is 
the only deterministic term. This also suggests that there are no omitted variables from the 
long-run equations that approximately follow a linear trend. 
Table 2: Estimated panel long-run relationship and short-run adjustment for ïñ(óòô) 
 ïñ(£ß®ô) ïñ(ü†°¢$ô) 
 Int Trend Int Trend FGHID 0.387*** 
(4.41) 
0.209 
(0.70) 
0.783*** 
(4.57) 
0.131 
(0.21) 
Intercept -3.380* 
(-1.93) 
-10.992 
(-0.28) 
-5.078** 
(-2.47) 
-29.656 
(-0.82) 
Trend  0.006 
(0.25) 
 0.016 
(0.75) 
Adjustment -0.164*** 
(-6.61) 
-0.251*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.158*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.246*** 
(-8.22) 
Table 2 notes. The estimated long-run coefficients, with t-ratios given in parentheses, are reported for each 
measure of inequality, FGHID, specified in the top row, where AB($CD) is the dependent variable. The column 
headed Int indicates that the only deterministic term included is an intercept while the column headed Trend 
indicates that both an intercept and trend are included as deterministic terms. *, ** and *** denote rejection of 
the zero coefficient null at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All results reported in this table are the 
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estimated long-run relationships with short-run adjustment produced with Stata 14 IC using the mg option with 
the xtwest command provided by Persyn and Westerlund (2008). 
In the two long-run models where the only deterministic term included is an intercept the 
inequality measures are both significant at the 1% level and exhibit the expected positive 
coefficient sign. Because both cointegrating equations that include absolute inequality 
measures have double log specifications, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. 
According to the overall absolute inequality measure (cUVD) a 1% rise in absolute inequality 
leads to around a 0.39% increase in real house prices whereas a 1% rise in the top 5% market 
income (NOP5$D) leads to an approximate 0.78% increase in real house prices. 
Table 3 reports panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimates of the long-run relationships 
assuming homogeneous coefficients across countries and with only an intercept included as 
a deterministic term in the model for both inequality measures where cointegration was 
found. Both inequality measures are significant at the 1% level and the estimated elasticities 
are around 0.30 for cUVD and 0.61 for NOP5$D. Whilst slightly lower than the estimates 
implied by the Westerlund (2007) model they are not too dissimilar. This suggests that the 
results are broadly robust in the sense of positive and significant coefficients on the inequality 
measures as well as the coefficient on NOP5$D	being around twice as large as that on the other 
inequality measures. 
Table 3: Estimated panel DOLS long-run relationship  
 ïñ(£ß®ô) ïñ(ü†°¢$ô) FGHID 0.302*** 
(10.613) 
0.612*** 
(10.991) 
Table 3 notes. The DOLS estimated long-run coefficients, with t-ratios based on HAC standard errors given in 
parentheses, are reported for each measure of inequality, FGHID, specified in the top row, where AB($CD) is the 
dependent variable. Leads and lags are chosen using the AIC with a maximum of 3 leads and 3 lags with only 
an intercept included as a deterministic term. 
Whilst our tests suggest that the cointegrating equations are homogeneous across all 18 
countries we report DOLS estimates of the long-run equations for each of the individual 
countries in Table 4 (these are plotted in Figure 3). The general results are robust across both 
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absolute inequality measures in the following ways. First, for 14 countries the coefficient on 
absolute inequality (however measured) is positive and significant at the 1% level. Second, 
for one country (SWE) this coefficient is positive and only significant at the 10% level. Third, 
for one country (JAP) this coefficient is positive if insignificant. Fourth, for two countries 
(GER and KOR) the coefficient on inequality is negative and significant. Hence, while these 
results may be arguably interpreted as supporting the homogeneity of the coefficient on 
inequality for 15 of the countries (in the sense that it is positive and significant) there are 
doubts that this homogeneity extends to three of the countries in the panel.  
Table 4: Estimated individual country DOLS long-run relationships 
   
    Var Top5$ 
   
   AUS  0.531***  1.103*** 
 ( 7.575) ( 7.732) 
BEL  0.624***  1.089*** 
 ( 5.640) ( 4.403) 
CAN  0.348***  0.720*** 
 ( 12.053) ( 10.475) 
DEN  0.427***  0.861*** 
 ( 3.968) ( 4.171) 
FIN  0.263***  0.522*** 
 ( 5.689) ( 5.640) 
FRA  0.486***  0.874*** 
 ( 3.012) ( 2.905) 
GER -0.117*** -0.193*** 
 (-3.481) (-3.169) 
IRE  0.508***  0.989*** 
 ( 8.302) ( 9.916) 
ITA  0.227***  0.446*** 
 ( 3.528) ( 3.765) 
JAP  0.011  0.047 
 ( 0.228) ( 0.483) 
KOR -0.136*** -0.204*** 
 (-4.724) (-3.481) 
NET  0.924***  1.881*** 
 ( 5.207) ( 6.327) 
NEW  0.428***  0.874*** 
 ( 12.808) ( 11.177) 
NOR  0.409***  0.822*** 
 ( 7.268) ( 7.193) 
SPA  0.554***  1.188*** 
 ( 7.153) ( 7.197) 
SWE  0.242*  0.473* 
 ( 1.914) ( 1.837) 
UKD  0.531***  1.035*** 
 ( 8.427) ( 7.633) 
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USA  0.147***  0.315*** 
 ( 4.906) ( 5.236) 
   
   
 
Figure 3: Individual country DOLS estimates 
 
 
4.3 Direction of causation 
The Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests on the reverse regression with inequality 
as the dependent variable regressed on AB($CD) reject cointegration for all four inequality 
measures regardless of the deterministic specification (Table 5). Hence, for all measures of 
inequality this is suggestive that inequality is weakly exogenous with respect to AB $CD  and 
that the cointegration results reported in Table 1 are not subject to lower power due to the 
violation of weak exogeneity. This is particularly the case for the two absolute inequality 
measures (AB(cUVD) and AB(NOP5$D)) where cointegration is evident in Table 1. A further 
implication of the suggestion of the two absolute measures of inequality (AB(cUVD) and 
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AB(NOP5$D)) being weakly exogenous with respect to AB $CD  is that there is uni-directional 
long-run Granger-causality from absolute inequality to AB($CD) and no reverse causality in 
the opposite direction. 
Table 5: Robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration tests of öõúùô on ïñ(óòô) 
 ûöõöô ü†°¢%ô ïñ(£ß®ô) ïñ(ü†°¢$ô) 
 Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Lå 0.747 0.247 0.818 0.487 1.000 0.462 1.000 0.267 L% 0.930 0.565 0.963 0.777 1.000 0.458 1.000 0.187 Cå 0.595 0.517 0.618 0.483 0.985 0.938 0.970 0.792 C% 0.550 0.567 0.597 0.570 0.987 0.862 0.975 0.713 
Leads 1.06 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.39 1.50 1.17 1.33 
Lags 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.33 0.89 0.72 0.44 0.61 
Table 5 notes. See notes to Table 1 except the row labelled FGHID denotes the inequality measure that is as the 
dependent variable in the potential cointegrating equation with AB($CD) as the regressor. 
The individual country probability values of t-tests for long-run GNC based on time-series 
regressions (Tabe 6) confirm the above finding that for the overwhelming majority of 
countries there is no evident violation of the weak exogeneity assumption, which implies that 
the cointegration results from the Westerlund (2007) tests reported above are valid. The 
columns headed INEQ to LHP” refer to tests of the null hypothesis, $e+:	-+ = 0, that is, that FGHI does not Granger-cause AB $CD  in the long-run, whereas the columns headed “LHP 
to INEQ” refer to tests of the null hypothesis, $e6:	-6 = 0, that is, whether FGHI is weakly 
exogenous with respect to the parameters in the equation for ∆AB $CD . 
To interpret our results we use a 5% level of significance in all cases. For 13 countries 
there is evidence that, in the long-run, AB(cUVD) Granger-causes AB $CD  and that AB $CD  
does not Granger-cause AB(c(¶D). For two countries (CAN and NEW) there is bi-directional 
long-run Granger-causality, for three countries (IRE, JAP and SPA) there is evidence of no 
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long-run Granger-causality in either direction, and for no country is there evidence of uni-
directional long-run Granger-causality from AB $CD  to AB(c(¶D). 
Table 6: Time-series long-run GNC tests 
      
      
Country 
ïñ(£§•ô) ïñ(ü†°¢$ô) 
Lag Pt(ecm) Pt(ecm) Lag Pt(ecm) Pt(ecm) 
AIC INEQ to LHP LHP to INEQ AIC INEQ to LHP LHP to INEQ 
       
       AUS 2 0.033** 0.142 3 0.072* 0.438 
BEL 1 0.007*** 0.425 1 0.007*** 0.270 
CAN 3 0.002*** 0.033** 3 0.001*** 0.066* 
DEN 1 0.014** 0.987 1 0.013** 0.850 
FIN 1 0.003*** 0.805 1 0.003*** 0.628 
FRA 1 0.008*** 0.445 1 0.011** 0.479 
GER 3 0.043** 0.296 3 0.092* 0.898 
IRE 2 0.058* 0.075* 2 0.059* 0.062* 
ITA 2 0.000*** 0.644 2 0.000*** 0.632 
JAP 2 0.146 0.766 2 0.167 0.827 
KOR 2 0.000*** 0.412 2 0.000*** 0.397 
NET 1 0.006*** 0.082* 1 0.003*** 0.105 
NEW 1 0.013** 0.009*** 1 0.023** 0.003*** 
NOR 1 0.015** 0.083* 1 0.017** 0.050* 
SPA 1 0.112 0.050* 1 0.079* 0.046** 
SWE 1 0.003*** 0.470 3 0.139 0.840 
UKD 1 0.021** 0.438 1 0.020** 0.539 
USA 3 0.014** 0.982 3 0.008*** 0.804 
      
Table 6 note. Pt(ecm) denotes the probability value of a t-test on the error-correction term (the time-series tests 
of LR GNC). Lag AIC denotes the VAR lag length chosen according to AIC criterion. INEQ to LHP refers to 
tests of the measure of inequality Granger-causing LHP while LHP to INEQ refers to tests of LHP Granger-
causing inequality. 
For the AB(NOP5$D) measure of inequality there is evidence of uni-directional long-run 
Granger causality to AB $CD  for 11 countries. For one country (NEW) there is evidence of 
bi-directional long-run Granger-causality, for five countries (AUS, GER, IRE, JAP and 
SWE) there is no long-run Granger causality in either direction and for one country (SPA) 
there is evident uni-directional long-run Granger causality from AB $CD  to AB(NOP5$D).  
Overall, the time-series Granger-causality test results from Table 6 show that for the vast 
majority of countries in our sample the direction of Granger-causality is from FGHI to 
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AB $CD . The anomalies found may be due to small (time-series) sample effects, Type I errors 
and questionable cointegrating equations in the case of GER and JAP (as reported in Table 
4). 17  
 
4.4 Is it inequality or income growth that drives house prices? 
In section 4.1 it was established that the two absolute inequality measures cointegrated 
with AB($CD) on their own. We next consider whether the natural logarithm of real GDP 
(denoted AB(LiCD)) also cointegrates with AB($CD). This analysis is restricted to 16 countries 
(the two countries excluded are NEW and KOR). 
First of all, it is important to note that AB(LiCD) is I(1) for 12 countries (AUS, BEL, CAN, 
DEN, FIN, GER, ITA, NET, NOR, SPA, SWE and the USA), I(1) around a linear trend in 1 
country (JAP) and at least I(2) for the other 3 countries according to at least one of the two 
panel unit root tests. Therefore, it is in principle possible that the GDP variable cointegrates 
on its own with AB($CD) given that they generally have the same orders of integration. 
Table 7 reports the bivariate Westurlund (2007) statistics for null of no cointegration 
between AB($CD) and AB(LiCD), and shows that there is no evidence of cointegration. The 
lack of evident cointegration between AB($CD) and AB(LiCD) is in line with Knoll et al.’s 
(2014) observation that real house price growth has significantly outpaced income growth 
during the period under study. More importantly for our purpose, this finding shows that the 
significance of the absolute inequality measures is not due to overall income growth but 
instead due to an increasingly unequal distribution of income.  
 
                                                
17 Given our use of a 5% significance level we might expect one or two of these tests to incorrectly reject the 
null hypothesis and, therefore, the small number of violations of weak exogeneity may be due to Type I errors. 
This may be especially the case for the borderline rejections found for Canada and Spain whereas the rejections 
for New Zealand are quite strong. 
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Table 7: robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration tests of ïñ(óòô) on ©™£ô 
 AB(V´rPD) 
 Int Trend Lå 0.663 1.000 L% 0.890 0.983 Cå 0.293 0.970 C% 0.123 0.932 
Leads 1.44 1.38 
Lags 1.13 1.13 
Table 7 notes. See notes to Table 1 except the row labelled |¨cD denotes the non-inequality covariate involved 
in the potential cointegrating equation with AB($CD) as the dependent variable. 
 
4.5 Does the inclusion of monetary policy change the results? 
So far the results showed that the two absolute inequality measures AB(cUVD) and AB NOP5$D  cointegrated with AB($CD) on their own and that the two relative inequality 
measures LMBMD  and NOP5%D , and AB(LiCD) do not cointegrate with AB($CD) on their 
own. We next consider whether these results stay robust when the real short-term interest 
rate (VD) is considered as covariate. 
First, we find that the interest rate series is unlikely to be cointegrated on its own with AB($CD) because in many cases they have a different order of integration. While AB($CD) is 
at least I(1) for the majority of countries, the Cerrato et al. (2011) and Pesaran (2007) based 
tests suggests that (VD) is I(0) for 9 countries (BEL, CAN, FIN, GER, ITA, NET, NOR, SPA 
and SWE) and I(1) for the remaining 7 countries. That the real interest is I(0) for many 
countries is consistent with the Fisher hypothesis, even when nominal interest rates and the 
rate of inflation are I(1) on their own (see, for examples, Malliaropulos (2000), Costantini 
and Lupi (2007), Omay and Yuksel (2015), Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2016)). However, 
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having said this, potentially (VD) can still form part of the cointegrating relationship with AB($CD) when it is considered a covariate with another I(1) explanatory variable. 
Table 8 reports Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration tests for trivariate regressions of AB($CD) on VD and FGHID and AB($CD) on VD and AB(LiCD). The results show that all four 
tests unambiguously indicate no evident cointegration for the models involving the two 
relative inequality variables. The same is true for all four tests where the trivariate regressions 
consider AB(NOP$D) and VD as covariates. This is a surprising result given that AB($CD) 
cointegrates with AB(NOP$D) in bivariate regressions. Potential explanations could include, 
first, reduced efficiency due to increased covariates that raise (lower) the coefficient standard 
error (t-ratio) of the adjustment coefficient upon which the cointegration tests are based. 
Second, the removal of two countries from the panel when using trivariate models relative to 
bivariate models. 
The trivariate model containing the explanatory variables AB(LiCD) and VD also does not 
suggest cointegration at the 5% level (one tests indicates cointegration at the 10% level). 
Hence, the only trivariate regression that suggests evidence of cointegration at the 5% level 
contains	AB(cUVD) and VD. While there is some ambiguity over the support for cointegration 
(five out of eight tests indicate cointegration at the 5% level)18, these specifications exhibit 
the most convincing evidence favouring cointegration of the trivaraite models. Hence, the 
results of Table 8 broadly confirm our main finding of Section 4.1 that absolute inequality 
seemingly is cointegrated with real house prices, whereas relative inequality and income are 
not. 
 
 
 
                                                
18 This ambiguity may be due to some loss of efficiency because of the number of variables included in the 
estimated models. 
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Table 8: robust p-values for Westerlund’s (2007) test of ïñ(óòô) considering ®ô 
	  LMBMD NOP5%D AB(cUVD) AB(NOP5$D) AB(LiCD) |¨cD Det Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend Int Trend 
V D	
Lå 0.943 0.995 0.997 0.988 0.277 0.625 0.617 0.923 0.830 0.908 L% 0.848 0.572 0.888 0.503 0.043** 0.022** 0.788 0.948 0.918 0.675 Cå 0.123 0.480 0.287 0.528 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.232 0.687 0.090* 0.245 C% 0.210 0.500 0.473 0.612 0.092* 0.042** 0.247 0.392 0.280 0.210 
Leads 1.88 2.00 1.81 2.13 1.75 2.00 1.56 1.88 2.19 2.13 
Lags 2.19 2.06 1.94 2.25 2.06 2.25 1.88 2.13 2.06 1.88 
 
We therefore proceed in estimating the long-run relationship for the regression of 	AB($CD) on AB(cUVD) and (VD). Given our relatively small time-series dimension panel DOLS 
equilibrium estimates are arguably more efficient than those obtained from Westerlund’s 
ADL model and are reported in Table 9. The coefficients on both AB(cUVD) and VMD are 
significant at the 5% level and have the expected sign. The regression also has plausible 
coefficients, suggesting that a 1% rise in inequality induces an increase in house prices of 
around 0.4%, and that a 1% rise in real interest rates causes house prices to fall by about 
1.7%. This model is therefore regarded as both theoretically and econometrically supported 
as a valid cointegrating equation. 
Table 9: Trivariate DOLS panel long-run relationships for ïñ(óòô) 
 AB(c(¶D) 
Determ Int VMD	 -1.735** 
(-2.088) FGHID 0.409*** 
(9.910) 
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The coefficient of AB(cUVD) from this trivariate regression is lower than that obtained with 
the bivariate cointegration results (reported in Table 3). This suggests that the removal of two 
countries from the panel may have some impact on the estimated. This trivariate regression 
supports cointegration between house prices and absolute inequality is consistent and 
confirming of our bivariate cointegration analysis. However, we prefer the trivariate 
estimates because there is support for plausible cointegration between all three variables and 
they provide partial correlation coefficients rather than the simple correlation coefficients 
obtained from bivariate equations. 
Finally, Table 10 presents individual country long-run relationships for AB($CD) on AB(cUVD) and (VD). With the exception of Japan and Germany, all sample countries exhibit a 
significant and positive relationship between absolute inequality and real house prices. 
Again, these findings are in line with the bivariate results (presented in Table 4). The real 
interest rate, on the other hand, is only significant and has the expected negative sign in nine 
out of the 16 countries.  
Table 10: Individual country DOLS trivariate long-run relationships 
   
    AB(c(¶D) VMD 
   
   AUS  0.559*** -3.351*** 
 ( 13.217) (-4.761) 
BEL  0.642*** -4.170* 
 ( 5.344) (-1.753) 
CAN  0.436***  1.897** 
 ( 15.634) ( 2.703) 
DEN  0.134** -11.041*** 
 ( 2.762) (-10.299) 
FIN  0.597***  9.739*** 
 ( 12.464) ( 14.591) 
FRA  1.018*** -1.648 
 ( 5.975) (-1.156) 
GER -0.104***  1.666*** 
 (-4.087) ( 3.006) 
IRE  0.545*** -4.495*** 
 ( 36.878) (-16.221) 
ITA  0.549***  4.492*** 
 ( 7.332) ( 3.073) 
JAP -0.114* -3.537 
 (-1.907) (-1.675) 
NET  0.811*** -10.259*** 
 ( 14.195) (-13.082) 
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NOR  0.531*** -1.636 
 ( 6.220) (-0.461) 
SPA  1.030***  5.098 
 ( 6.739) ( 1.635) 
SWE  0.361*** -4.697*** 
 ( 5.853) (-5.901) 
UKD  0.587*** -1.451** 
 ( 9.046) (-2.425) 
USA  0.249***  5.620 
 ( 3.301) ( 1.696) 
   
   
 
5. Conclusions 
The presented results provide two novel insights. First, increasing income inequality 
contributed to the rise in real house prices in 15 out of 18 countries OECD countries during 
the period 1975-2010. Second, the results are sensitive to the usage of relative and absolute 
inequality measures. 
To be more precise, the bivariate cointegration analysis suggests that the natural logarithm 
of the variance (AB(cUVD)) and the natural logarithm of the market income of the top 5% 
(AB(NOP5$D)) individually form irreducible cointegrating equations with AB($CD) with 
theoretically plausible coefficients in 15 out of the 18 countries. There is little ambiguity in 
these cointegration results, the causation is from inequality to house prices, and the 
significance of the absolute inequality measures cannot be attributed to an overall growth in 
incomes but to an increasingly unequal distribution of income. Together with absolute 
inequality, the short-term real interest rate (VD) also shows evidence of cointegration with AB($CD) in nine countries. The two relative inequality measures used, on the other hand, do 
not show any signs of cointegration. 
The finding that the recent surge in house prices partly was driven by rising absolute 
income inequality contributes to a growing literature that finds that the recent inequality 
increase has important negative socio-economic effects (see e.g. OECD, 2015). Moreover, it 
suggests that the current focus on relative inequality measures is unduly restrictive and that 
33 
more attention should be given to alternative inequality measures like the ones presented in 
this article. 
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